Non-aggression Is Not An Axiom

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The non-aggression principle [NAP] is not an axiom. By the term “axiom” I more or less mean something that is self-evident and irreducible, a stand-alone principle that functions as an obvious starting point from which everything else springs. This is not to say that I don’t advocate the non-aggression principle or do not think that it is important, but it is to say that I think that its treatment in this way, as an “axiom”, is a serious mistake that has had the consequence of oversimplifying libertarianism and providing no basis out of which to stop it from fragmenting into a multitude of contradicting social philosophies.

The first issue that strikes me is that, based on a plain statement of the non-aggression principle by itself, it is unclear how “aggression” and “defense” are distinguished from each other, let alone what sort of view on violent “punishment” is supposed to jibe with it, and hence it seems like that would have to be clearly defined ahead of time. In short, the non-aggression principle will fragment into anything ranging from pacifism to a gun-ho cowboy doctrine without a much more elaborate philosophical investigation of the question. The moment that one does engage in a more elaborate investigation of this, the non-aggression principle quite clearly ceases to be irreducible and self-evident.

Another issue that inevitably rears its ugly head is that the non-aggression principle will potentially have completely different implications with respect to the question of property depending on what theory of property one assumes to begin with. After all, what constitutes “theft” is vitally dependent on what one would consider to be the basis for “justly owning” something in the first place, and how violence “in defense of property” is conceived of is unclear from a statement of the non-aggression principle alone. Once again, just like the question of a theory of “defense” and “punishment”, the moment that we delve into a theory of property, the non-aggression principle is no longer functioning as if it is irreducible and self-evident, since its meaning is dependent on other theories and principles.

But the reasons for the non-aggression principle not being axiomatic runs much deeper than this. For one thing, it seems quite simplistic to act as if the entirety of moral and social philosophy can be completely reduced to the question “when is physical violence justified or unjustified?”. This is simply out of touch with the entire history of moral philosophy, and the treatment of non-aggression as the only relevant principle actually functionally designates everything else to an “amoral” realm. This completely skips over any attempt to make an evaluation of different values, customs, and moral systems on their own merits, and it’s quite clear that the non-aggression principle alone is, while perhaps necessary, not really sufficient as a basis to evaluate such things.

Perhaps more importantly, it doesn’t make any sense for someone to simply accept the non-aggression principle at face value, without any underlying grounds for doing so. One would think that people accept the non-aggression principle because they have some sort of basic respect for people, not that they have some sort of basic respect for people because of the non-aggression principle. The very idea of accepting a principle for its own sake might be called into question: does anyone really do this? It would seem to make a lot more sense to propose that the non-aggression principle is a conclusion drawn from more fundamental premises, rather than as an ungrounded starting point from which all other premises are drawn.

This is what I mean when I insist, despite many libertarians’ claims to the contrary, that the non-aggression principle is not an axiom. It does not mean that it is false or irrelevant, but that, if we want to be frank about it: it is literally completely meaningless and toothless without a grounding and without its terms being clearly established ahead of time, and consequentially just about everything that libertarians may tend to oppose, as well as just about any conceivable social system, can theoretically be compatibalized with it in the absence of a coherent grounding. And it is in this sense that Ayn Rand, while her blanket dismissals of libertarians may be too harsh and somewhat of a strawman, had a valid point when she noted a certain incoherancy to the libertarian movement, in that it comes off very much like a mish-mash of contradicting social philosophies.

Posted by Brainpolice

Gary Chartier said…

To be clear: I agree with you 100% that whatever one says about non-aggression, it’s not axiomatic—it’s rooted in more general moral principles. And I can imagine a group of people getting along reasonably well and generally adhering to this principle while endorsing it for a broad range of theoretical reasons, some consequentialist, some deontological, some aretaic. (I can even imagine some of them endorsing it as an unquestionable, ungrounded given, even though I don’t think of it that way. But I agree with you that they’d be silly to do so.)

So please understand my comments, not as disagreements with the thesis propounded in the title of your essay, but just as random pot-shots.

1. When you say that it is unclear how “aggression” and “defense” are supposed to be distinguished from each other when the principle is operationalized, doesn’t this depend on how the principle is stated? Does the LP pledge, precluding the initiation of force, which would be, for many people, a canonical statement of the NAP, provide any guidance here? If we define “aggression” as “initiation of force,” are we still stuck in the same swamp, or does the account implicitly provided by the pledge clarify things at all?

2. Since I don’t believe in punishment (I do believe in other things, including restraint and restitution), I find it easy to assume that no account of violent punishment jibes with the NAP.

3. I think you’re dead-on when you talk about property. (Obviously, one could avoid this problem simply by not including property at all in the principle.) The principle can’t do a lot of work manuy of its proponents think it should until property rights get defined.

4. Do you think many proponents of the NAP really think it sums up the entirety of moral and political philosophy? Sensible proponents, like Rothbard, would say, I think, that the NAP is simply a claim about when physical force is justified; it’s not a claim about what people have reason to do or not do in general, and so not a general moral theory. I know there are lots of vulgars who seem to act as if the fact that something is consistent with the NAP means that it must be OK. But can you think of a serious proponent of the principle who, or a serious, canonical statement of it that, suggests this?

5. Even though, as I’ve made clear, I’m inclined to agree with you about this, I wonder why you think it should make no sense for someone to simply accept the NAP without underlying grounds. There are clearly respectable moral theories in accordance with which one simply knows particular duties in particular cases (think Jonathan Dancy) or directly intuits particular principles (think, maybe, W. D. Ross or Henry Sidgwick). Do you mean to dismiss all of them by saying this?

6. What’s wrong with a mish-mash of conflicting philosophies in a political movement? Suppose five people all want to increase freedom and topple the state: one is an Aristotelian, one is a Kantian, one is a consequentialist, one is a deontological intuitionist, and one is a divine command theorist. Why should this matter if they can endorse a substantive political program and work together to achieve it? Why shouldn’t someone think that others’ instincts may be better than their theories, judging that they’re in touch with reality even if they haven’t represented it correctly? Why should it be necessary for people to agree on premises for this purpose? July 26, 2009 7:30 PM

Brainpolice said…

“1. When you say that it is unclear how “aggression” and “defense” are supposed to be distinguished from each other when the principle is operationalized, doesn’t this depend on how the principle is stated? Does the LP pledge, precluding the initiation of force, which would be, for many people, a canonical statement of the NAP, provide any guidance here? If we define “aggression” as “initiation of force,” are we still stuck in the same swamp, or does the account implicitly provided by the pledge clarify things at all?”

I think it’s still somewhat unclear, in that we need something more in order to avoid things like, say, the “maximalist” position that Rothbard talked about (and rejected on the grounds of proportionality) in TEOL.

“2. Since I don’t believe in punishment (I do believe in other things, including restraint and restitution), I find it easy to assume that no account of violent punishment jibes with the NAP.”

I’m actually with you on this one. My view on violent punishment is that, as I define it, it inherently is an NAP violation. Of course, I distinguish this from restitution.

“4. Do you think many proponents of the NAP really think it sums up the entirety of moral and political philosophy? Sensible proponents, like Rothbard, would say, I think, that the NAP is simply a claim about when physical force is justified; it’s not a claim about what people have reason to do or not do in general, and so not a general moral theory.”

Walter Block at least seems to speak of it in this way – or, at least, he seems to have a rather “legalistic” view of libertarianism. And, while some may have moral conceptions outside of the NAP, sometimes they fall into a tendencies of nonetheless acting as if physical violence is all that matters, due to such an exclusive focus on it.

“5. Even though, as I’ve made clear, I’m inclined to agree with you about this, I wonder why you think it should make no sense for someone to simply accept the NAP without underlying grounds. There are clearly respectable moral theories in accordance with which one simply knows particular duties in particular cases (think Jonathan Dancy) or directly intuits particular principles (think, maybe, W. D. Ross or Henry Sidgwick). Do you mean to dismiss all of them by saying this?”

I’m not particularly familiar with those moral theories. I will say that I find deontology oversimplistic. “Duty for its own sake” and principles without grounds is something I find to be incoherant.

“6. What’s wrong with a mish-mash of conflicting philosophies in a political movement? Suppose five people all want to increase freedom and topple the state: one is an Aristotelian, one is a Kantian, one is a consequentialist, one is a deontological intuitionist, and one is a divine command theorist. Why should this matter if they can endorse a substantive political program and work together to achieve it? Why shouldn’t someone think that others’ instincts may be better than their theories, judging that they’re in touch with reality even if they haven’t represented it correctly? Why should it be necessary for people to agree on premises for this purpose?”

Well, one concern is that later down the line, post-“alliance”, it will actually reduce to possible violent conflict and separatism. And, for example, it doesn’t seem to make much sense for an anti-racist to ally with ethnic nationalists simply because they may be anti-statists. This would be undermining their own broader social goals. July 27, 2009 1:22 AM

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